The Huffington Post Op Ed 7 12 10

Did Brigadier-General Mehdi Moini, who commands Iran’s Islamic Revolution’s Guards Corps (IRGC) in the Iranian West Azerbaijan province, fail to read events through, or was he conducting psychological counter-warfare? Moini was interviewed by the Iranian television channel Press TV, following media reports on the presence of American and Israeli forces in Azerbaijan along the borders of his province in northwest Iran. In that region, Iran has a 550-mile border with Iraq, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Moini said that IRGC mobilized its troops in the area and that his forces’ move has frustrated the enemy’s attempts to destabilize the western Iranian province. Moini claimed that while the enemy was damaged in the course of his movements, no Iranian base was compromised. Moini failed to identify the enemy, but claimed, “Certain Western countries” are muddying the water in Azerbaijan “by provoking ethnic and religious strife in the region and inciting terrorist groups, they seek to destabilize our province.”

Ethnic and religious strife? Really?

Is the real reason for the rumored presence of U.S. forces in Azerbaijan, “to destabilize western Iran?” Is General Moini reading his maps correctly? It would be interesting to hear his explanation about the reported concentration of U.S. forces, and its allies’ warships, in the Persian Gulf, near Iran’s southern borders, more than a thousand miles away from his province. Would he call it “a fishing expedition?”

Is General Moini that naive?

King Solomon, the wisest of all men, said in Proverbs 27:22, “Though thou shouldest bray a fool in a mortar with a pestle among groats, yet will not his foolishness depart from him.”

The Jewish Sages offer an interpretation of the verse: Although the fool acknowledges that he’s being ground in the mortar, he claims that the hulled grains around him are the target of the pestle, while he just happens to be there.

Since neither Moini nor his employers are fools, his remarks can be interpreted as a response in-kind to what Iran sees as psychological warfare, rather than a genuine threat.

Whether Iran misreads what the naked eye can see, or says one thing while readying itself for a military clash, if the reports on troop concentration in southern and northwestern Iran are accurate, then they reflect a serious and ominous step toward a potential military confrontation with Iran.

The rapid deterioration of U.S. and NATO relations with Turkey accelerated its pace when news about troops’ concentration in Azerbaijan started developing. Has Azerbaijan’s choice demonstrated the U.S.’s increased concern that Turkey is turning east toward Iran and therefore cannot be relied upon should U.S.-Iran hostilities commence?

There is no doubt that the region is simmering. Recently, there were separate visits to Israel by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Leon Panetta and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Arab sources claimed that the meetings in Israel focused on Iran’s nuclear program. Did these visits and the concentration of troops imply preparations for an imminent military confrontation with Iran? U.S. government officials routinely deny any current U.S. plans to attack Iran, but should the Iranians believe U.S. declarations or read their own intelligence reports regarding the West’s military presence in the region?

Should the Iranians have a genuine cause for concern? Given the data, you can decide for yourself: There are more than 30 U.S. military installations encircling Iran on all sides, from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the north, to Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Jordan in the southeast, and Afghanistan and Pakistan in the northeast. Just last month there were extensive naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean Sea of U.S., British, French and other nations’ forces.

French Rafale F3 fighter jets carrying the nuclear-tipped ASMP/A missiles trained ‘touch and go’ landing on the USS Harry S. Truman, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; U.S. pilots flew French Super Etendard fighter jets, landing them on the French Charles De Gaulle nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; French pilots flew U.S. F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, landing them on the USS Harry S. Truman.

The U.S. Navy’s deployment near Iran is significant. It includes USS Nassau, an amphibious assault ship carrying AV-8B Harrier attack planes, AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters, CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters and 3,000 U.S. Marines of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. The U.S. force also includes USS Mesa Verde, carrying 800 U.S. Marines and USS Ashlan. These warships join the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group, which includes 12 warships. The U.S. naval force is deployed in the Persian Gulf near Chahbahar, not far from the Iran-Pakistan border where the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s naval base is located. West of this location, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Strike Group is patrolling.

There were reports that the U.S. was moving 387 bunker-buster bombs, as well as 195 smart Blu-110 bombs and 192 huge 2,000 pound Blu-117 bombs, from California to the U.S. base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, in preparation for a possible attack on Iranian nuclear installations that are deep in the ground and protected by several meters of enforced concrete.

There were reports that Greece allowed Israeli jets to train in its air space, which coincidentally – or not – is the same distance from Israel as Iran, a necessary training should Israel target Iranian nuclear reactors. Other Iranian sources report that Israel has concentrated fighter jets in Azerbaijan, and previously there were persistent rumors that Israel maintains military satellite monitoring equipment in Azerbaijan, and is allowed to run listening devices near the Iranian border and on the shores of the Caspian Sea. Last month, Egypt allowed an Israeli Dolphin nuclear submarine to cross the Suez Canal toward the Persian Gulf.

In parallel, there are reports that a significant number of Iranian tanks and antiaircraft artillery were redeployed near the Iranian border with Azerbaijan and took additional preparations should hostilities break.

One unintended consequence of the massive naval force deployment in the Gulf is the surprise cancellation of the Iranian plan to send a ship with aid to Gaza. Under the U.N. Security Council’s recent resolution, all Iranian ships are subject to stop and search. Perhaps the Iranians planned to stock the ship with more than just bags of flour and rice?

There is no doubt that the U.S.’s and allies’ moves are meant to signal to the Iranians that they mean business. Either the Iranians abandon their nuclear armament plans, or the West will destroy their facilities. In such a showdown, reminiscent of the high noon duel in Hollywood Westerns, the parties must remember – before the situation develops into a full-fledged, regional war – the foreshadowing saying attributed to the Russian playwright Anton Chekhov: “If in the first act you have hung a pistol on the wall, then in the following one it should be fired. Otherwise don’t put it there.”

The Huffington Post Op Ed 7 08 10

At this very moment, there are growing rumors about plans for a prisoner swap that would return ten suspected Russian spies to Russia, in exchange for an imprisoned Russian military researcher Igor Sutyagin, who was convicted of espionage in 2004. The rumors also suggest that the U.S. has compiled a list of 11 Russian prisoners for the swap, including Sutyagin, Sergei Skripal, a former intelligence officer convicted of espionage, Alexander Zaporozhsky, convicted in 2003 and sentenced to 18 years for espionage, and Alexander Sypachyov, identified as a CIA agent and convicted in 2002.

If the rumors are substantiated, then the swap would be the biggest since the end of the Cold War. There are, however, a few questions that must be asked. First and foremost: What’s the rush?

It has been barely two weeks since the alleged Russian sleeper cell was arrested. The investigation is probably still at its embryonic stage, although the sleepers have been under FBI surveillance for several years. Nonetheless, once 10 of the 11 suspects are in custody, the FBI and other law enforcement agents have a unique opportunity to question the suspects and get answers to tough questions. The most important being: What other Russian spies are working clandestinely in the U.S.?

Given the poor compartmentalization of the sleepers, the FBI should be able to obtain from them investigative leads to find additional spies and “deep cover” Russian agents of influence. Avoiding the risk of facing up to 20 years in a federal prison is a strong enough incentive for the sleepers to sing songs for the FBI. However, if the suspected sleepers find out about Moscow’s rushed activity to conduct a swap with the U.S., their mouths will be permanently sealed.

Why bother to talk or cooperate? Why bother to negotiate a plea bargain if they know that soon the U.S. federal prison’s doors will open, and that they will walk with impunity?

The U.S. has a clear interest in the release of its own spies who are languishing in Russian prisons. However, these spies were already interrogated, tried, convicted and sentenced years ago. They were “peeled like an onion” as per Intel speak; therefore the Russians have no use for them. In contrast, there’s the question about the Russian sleepers. Why are the Russians rushing to swap them? Do they care that their citizens might find the prison’s food inedible? Perhaps they won’t have enough blankets? Or are the Russians concerned that the sleepers will talk and talk and turn in other Russian plants thus far uncovered by the U.S.? Maybe the Russians are concerned that the sleepers will reveal Russian training methods? Names of others trained with them in Russia? Emergency procedures?

These are golden nuggets of information that U.S. investigators are mining as these words are written. And if this is the case, the U.S. should not rush the swap and should definitely keep the sleepers who are currently in custody in isolation without outside contact. A Bedouin proverb says: “The rush is a satanic trait.” There’s a world of truth in these words.

The Huffington Post Op Ed 7 06 10

Is there a humanitarian crisis in Gaza that needs Turkish or Iranian support? Not according to Nicholas D. Kristof of the New York Times, who wrote just last week, “Visiting Gaza persuaded me, to my surprise, that Israel is correct when it denies that there is any full-fledged humanitarian crisis in Gaza.” Based on independent statistics, it seems that perhaps the Gazans should send humanitarian help to the people of Turkey and Iran, not the other way around. An even closer examination of the issue shows that what Gazans desperately need is a political change, not bodily sustenance.

Recently, seemingly compassionate and well meaning individuals and organizations (well, some of them at least) loaded a flotilla of ships bound for Gaza with humanitarian aid for the Palestinians under an Israeli maritime blockade. The ships carried food, medicines and other supplies the organizers thought the Gazans badly needed. (Rockets, explosives and ammunition were left behind. The Gazans have plenty).

Do the Gazans really need the humanitarian cargo? Unlikely. Look at the facts: Although Gaza is probably the densest area in the world, its residents seem to fare much better than the world’s average on many key factors, and definitely better than Iran or Turkey. Let’s start with the basics. Infant mortality: In Iran 35.8 out of 1,000 babies die at birth or during their first year, probably due to poor health care for mother and child. In Turkey the rate is 25.78 dead babies per 1,000 live births. What is the rate in Gaza? 18.35 deaths per 1,000, almost half of the rate in Iran and 30% less than that of Turkey. And how long are the surviving babies expected to live? In Gaza, to age 73.42, in Iran to age 71.14 and in Turkey to age 71.8.

Another relevant indicator is literacy rate, which reflects the country’s investment in education. In Gaza the literacy rate is 91.9%, but in Turkey it’s 88.7% and in Iran only 82.3%.

Interestingly, twice as many Palestinians living in the Palestinian Autonomy in the West Bank live above the poverty line than do their brothers in Gaza. This is likely because of the economic cooperation and almost completely open economic borders between Israel and the Autonomy. Cooperation has its benefits.

Is Gaza a paradise? Hardly. There are poor people, high unemployment and a growing uncertainty regarding the future. But there are also rich people – very rich indeed, like in any other society. In fact, in many respects, the Palestinians in Gaza are better off than their brothers in refugee camps in Lebanon who, for example, cannot even build new houses in the refugee camps under a Lebanese government ban.

Nonetheless, Palestinians in Gaza live in a pressure cooker. Their borders are sealed on all sides, by Israel and by Egypt, which doesn’t want any Islamic Brotherhood supporters from Gaza stirring more violence in Egypt. Hamas’s ideological partners assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Saadat and promise the same fate to his successors. On the other side of the border is Israel, which can’t be expected to feed the mouth that bites it (although much of the world’s media and people with an agenda seem to suggest that it do just this).

If you still wonder why Israel blockades the Gaza Strip and permits only goods that cannot support terror into the area, think of the 8,000 rockets, mortars and missiles that were fired indiscriminately from Gaza on Israeli civilian villages and towns, at a time that no part of the Gaza Strip was held by Israel. Israel’s subsequent 2008 attack on the Gaza Strip in operation Cast Lead significantly reduced the Palestinians’ will to continue shelling Israel.

Israel’s continued blockade is intended to guarantee that additional weapons and ammunition do not enter Gaza, should the Palestinians’ will to attack Israeli civilians ever reemerge. There is also the matter of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier kidnapped from Israeli territory and held hostage by Hamas for the past four years. Has he received humanitarian help? Humanitarian attention maybe? Perhaps allowed a single visit by the Red Cross? Don’t hold your breath. Hamas is not held to any humanitarian standard by the humanitarian aid flotilla organizers.

Is there hope for change in Gaza? Not until Hamas, a designated terror organization, is thrown out of power by the Palestinian people, or until Hamas ceases to be an Iranian agent in the region with a declared intention to destroy Israel. Its Charter spells it out clearly: “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.”

Palestinians in Gaza don’t need those shipments any more than Iran and Turkey do. The aid the Palestinians actually need from the outside in order to effect long-term change is guidance and help to change their political plight -which brings misery to many – not shipments of bags of flour and rice.

So, why were Turkish and Iranian organizations sending token humanitarian aid to Gaza when their own people are needier? They probably never heard of the Old Jewish Sages’ proverb concerning charity: The poor in your own city come first. However, those sending the flotilla to Gaza certainly listened to the immortal words Mario Puzo wrote for the Mafia Godfather Don Coreleone: “It’s all personal, every bit of business. Every piece of shit every man has to eat every day of his life is personal. They call it business. OK. But it’s personal as hell.”

The conclusion is painfully clear: It’s not a brotherly love for the Palestinians that motivated the Turkish and Iranian organizations and their backers, but their hatred for the Israelis and cynical political maneuvering on the backs of the Palestinians, abandoned by their Islamic brothers for 62 years and counting. Not only the pawn of Hamas, the Palestinians are now being further exploited by the Turks and Iranians.

The Huffington Post Op Ed 6 30 10

This week the U.S. Attorney’s Office in New York filed criminal complaints against ten alleged Russian sleeper agents in the U.S. Although the cases concern U.S. national security, the sleepers were not indicted for espionage but rather for lesser charges of money laundering related felonies and for failure to register as foreign agents, under a law primarily intended for lobbyists representing foreign countries. With the indictment arises a natural question: What was the Russian agents’ purpose in the U.S.?

SVR, the Russian intelligence service, successor to the KGB, spelled out their mission in a 2009 message to two of the defendants. The message was intercepted and decrypted by the FBI and reads, in part, as follows: You were sent to USA for long-term service trip. Your education, bank accounts, car, house etc. – all these serve one goal: fulfill your main mission, i.e. to search and develop ties in policymaking circles in US and send intels [intelligence reports] to C[enter].

The sleepers’ assignment was – if the intercepted message is credible and not a Russian disinformation decoy – to become “agents of influence,” serving the interests of a foreign country, as directed by its intelligence services. These agents, directly or indirectly spread propaganda or disinformation to contacts in rival intelligence agencies, to the general public through the media or to an unwitting highly placed – often political – contact, who would then be manipulated to take actions that advance foreign interests.

But were they trained to influence or recruit influencers? Hardly.

According to the FBI, the sleepers were trained to conduct agent-to-agent communications, to use brush-passes (a clandestine, hand-to-hand delivery of money or documents when one person walks past another in a “flash meeting” in a public place), to run short-wave radio operations and to use invisible writing and codes and ciphers. The training also covered Morse code, the creation and use of a cover profession, counter-surveillance measures, concealment and destruction of equipment and materials used in connection with clandestine work and the avoidance of detection. The FBI further asserts that defendants used steganography to hide data in images. Steganographic software that is not commercially available allowed the SVR and sleepers to communicate by embedding encrypted, invisible data in images that are located on publicly accessible websites; the data is of course detectable and decipherable with the right software. The sleepers also used radiograms, coded bursts of data sent by a radio transmitter that can be picked up by a radio receiver set to the proper frequency. As they are being transmitted, radiograms generally sound like the transmission of Morse code.

This is quintessential espionage training. Period.

Indeed, according to the FBI, the sleepers were performing traditional intelligence-gathering work, such as collecting information on small yield, high penetration nuclear warheads and data about Central Intelligence Agency job applicants.

The FBI concedes that the sleepers were under surveillance for several years, but the Department of Justice fell short of accusing them of espionage, which carries a life sentence. Why the lighter charge? Likely the evidence gathered thus far has been deemed insufficient to substantiate espionage.

The discrepancy between the content of the 2009 encrypted message and the alleged activity of the sleepers could mean that their assignment was a mixed bag of espionage and simultaneous preparations to become deeply rooted in American society until they could be effective agents of influence. If this assumption is accurate, the Russians have broken a basic intelligence rule that separates the gatherers from the influencers. Agents of influence are simply more likely to be influential when they assume a purportedly legit, visible and traditionally influential cover/profession, instead of the deeper covers used for intelligence-gathering purposes.

It is also possible that the sleepers – while “sleeping” – were kept busy with intelligence assignments from their Russian handlers, until they became ready to recruit assets for the influence job. There have been cases in which sleepers had little or no contact with their handlers and liked their new country so much, that they decided to remain asleep, living comfortably and hoping that their handlers would ultimately forget about them.

Professionals or amateurs? According to the FBI, at least one of the sleepers was rather clumsy. Anna Chapman believed an undercover FBI agent posing as a Russian Consulate employee and agreed to receive operating instructions from him. She even gave him her spy-tooled laptop for repair. The laptop was used, according to the FBI, to radio-exchange data with another laptop carried by a Russian official from a short distance. The FBI does not disclose how the undercover FBI agent managed to gain Chapman’s trust, but it appears that Chapman acted as a complete amateur when she fell for the FBI’s brilliant maneuver. Undercover operatives on a clandestine assignment in a foreign country are trained to avoid unsolicited contacts made by anyone, unless their handler has alerted them to the new contact’s identity, and the contact has confirmed the pre-determined code sentences (usually more than one) or other identification process, to guarantee his legitimacy. According to the FBI, all Chapman said initially was, “I just need to get some more information about you before I can talk.” And when the undercover FBI agent replied, “I work in the same department as you, but I work here in the consulate. Okay. My name is Roman. My name is Roman, I work in the consulate.” This exchange seems to have satisfied Chapman.

Incredibly, Chapman received (and followed) from the same undercover FBI agent instructions to approach another woman for the purpose of delivering a false passport. The instructions were: [The other woman] “will tell you… ‘Excuse me, but haven’t we met in California last summer?’ And you will say to her, ‘No, I think it was the Hamptons.'” Chapman asked, “The Hamptons?” and the FBI agent said, “The Hamptons and that is it. That is how you know and you just exchange, just give her the document [the fraudulent passport].” Didn’t it occur to Chapman that she failed to observe a similar identification procedure, before she exposed herself as a clandestine operative to a complete stranger who turned out to be an FBI agent?

In contrast, another defendant maintained the in-agent contact identification procedure with an undercover FBI agent before he agreed to perform a clandestine job. Neither the FBI affidavits nor the Complaint disclose how the FBI discovered the code sentences that would allow the two to discuss business openly.

In Intel speak, a “legal” operative is often a foreign diplomat stationed in a foreign country, also engaging in an illegal activity such as espionage. If caught, his diplomatic or consular immunity will save him from trial, and all the host country can do is declare him a PNG – persona non grata – and deport him. An “illegal” agent is a spy provided with a new, false identity along with a cover story – a legend. Usually his fraudulent documents give the illegal the identity of a legitimate citizen or legal resident of a country other than the sending country. “Illegals” are instructed to have a normal lifestyle, maintain innocuous employment and join relevant professional associations; sometimes, “illegals” operate in pairs and live and work together in the host country under the guise of a married couple and even have children.

It appears that the Russians have broken a covert work rule: never allow contacts between “legals” and “illegals.” If one of them is under counterintelligence surveillance – most probably the “legal,” then his encounter with the “illegal” would immediately contaminate and expose the “illegal.” Nonetheless, Russian officials in the U.S. met with the sleepers. “Elementary, my dear Watson,” Sherlock Holmes would have probably declared.

Did the sleepers pose a genuine risk to the U.S.’s national security? Sleeper cells tend to wake up when orders are given to carry out a mission. It could be collecting intelligence or recruiting assets, but there are also more ominous and heinous tasks than just gathering information or influencing politicians. Until the sleepers’ full story is revealed, it will be unclear why the Russians spent the effort and money, and took a significant political risk, to place the ring in the U.S.

The Huffington Post Op Ed 6 16 10

On May 14, 1876, the New York Times ridiculed the Ottoman Empire, reminding its readers that “It is now some twenty years since we began to hear about the ‘sick man upon the Bosphorus,’ yet the same sort of talk, under somewhat different conditions, is current today. The Ottoman Empire seems to have as many lives as the popular saying attributes to a cat, but seven or eight of those lives must have been already forfeited.” The article, which referred to the Ottoman arrogance and lack of diplomacy in dealing with a Bulgarian insurgency, signaled the beginning of the Ottoman Empire’s end.

The last Sultans ruled as autocrats, oppressing millions. The Empire was notoriously corrupt and their loyal supporters few in number. As self-proclaimed “Successors of the Prophet,” the sultans advocated strict Islamic ideology and pan-Islamism headed by their own supreme authority, thus conflicting with the liberal, secular ideals of the “Young Turk” movement and the West. Recognizing that they could not survive against the invading Russians, who sensed the Empire’s weakness, and minority uprisings from groups like the Armenians, the Ottomans turned to Germany for help. Aligning with the Germans proved fatal; Germany and Turkey lost World War I, the Empire was carved up, and what remained became Turkey under the helm of Atatürk in 1923.

Some 150 years after Turkey’s predecessor was labeled the “Sick Man Upon the Bosphorus,” Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is promoting a policy reminiscent of the years leading to the demise of the Ottoman Empire — choosing the wrong side in a conflict and misreading historical events.

Turkey has changed political course in more than one arena: it is ending a friendly relationship with Israel after decades of maintaining strong mutual military, trade and tourist ties; it put the Russians on guard by entering into a uranium enrichment agreement with Iran; and its relationships with NATO and the U.S. are at all-time lows. Turkey’s hopes of becoming the first Islamic member of the EU were reduced to ashes, and its aspiration to resolve the Cyprus occupation collapsed when Derviş Eroğlu, a Turkish nationalist, was recently elected leader of northern Cyprus. In eastern Turkey, talks with the Kurdish rebels fell apart, and clashes between the Kurds and the Turkish Army ensue.

Although each segment of Turkey’s international policy may seem independently driven, put together they paint a clear picture. Getting a cold shoulder from the West on several fronts, Erdoğan is opting for the warm reception of Iran and other proponents of a pan-Islamism.

This switch in allegiance is not sudden, nor incidental. As close ties with Israel were in place when he took office, Erdoğan leveraged them to “make nice” with Europe and the U.S., hoping to ease Turkey’s admission into the European Union by showing EU members they had no reason to fear an Islamic Turkey. At that point, despite being governed by a leader of the Islamic Party, Erdoğan implied, Turkey showed through its relations with Israel that its religion did not interfere with sober politics. When EU members remained unconvinced, pressuring Turkey to withdraw from northern Cyprus and end its oppression of the Kurds in Eastern Turkey, Erdoğan turned to a more welcoming ally, Islamic Iran.

By marking Israel as the villain, Erdoğan hopes to achieve several strategic goals, the primary being his own political survival. With a parliamentary election forthcoming in November 2011, and a majority win for his party unlikely, Erdoğan needed a rallying cry for unity. Like the 1881 Russian rioters’ outcry following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, “Kill the Jews and Save Russia,” Erdoğan is promoting Islamic solidarity with the Palestinians, much to the chagrin of the Turkish military, a staunchly secular body.

Systematically curtailing the military’s traditional role as protector of secular Turkey, as declared by Atatürk, the creator of modern Turkey, and as made clear in the Constitution, is a well-planned part of Erdoğan’s strategy. That the Turkish military has always advocated strong ties with Israel is yet another reason for Erdoğan to limit its influence, which he did by appointing two radical Muslim civilians to key military and intelligence positions: Hakan Fidan as head of MIT, Turkey’s foreign intelligence service, and Muammer Güler as Undersecretary for Public Order and Security, which heads Turkey’s counterterrorism.

The Turkish-Israeli conflict has now taken on a life of its own, fueled by Erdoğan’s self-imposed role as the champion of Gaza’s Hamas government and ultimate leader of the Islamic world. He will soon discover that it’s a pretty crowded rung, particularly as the Iranians see themselves as sole leaders. In a Turkish-Iranian race for Islamic hegemony, Turkey may find itself losing, and end up with nothing, least of all the West’s support, which Erdoğan is now sacrificing.

The last Sultans of the Ottoman Empire had similar global aspirations. History stands witness to the demise that followed.

Haaretz Op Ed 05 28 10

Time has come for the world to recognize that a nuclear-armed Iran could bring the economy to their knees by hiking the price of Middle East oil, and that what is needed is more than rhetoric and mild sanctions against Iran.

“Let’s tango with the Americans,” said Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to his aides.

“What style?” they asked. “Open-embrace tango, with space between the dancers, or close embrace, where you dance chest-to-chest?”

“Iranian-style,” said Ahmadinejad. “We lead, holding the Americans by the jugular, pulling them one step forward and pushing them two steps back.”

“What if they refuse to dance?” asked the aides.

“They won’t,” Ahmadinejad chuckled. “It’s been 31 years since our Islamic revolution, and the Americans still haven’t learned they’re dancing to our tune.”

An imaginary dialogue, of course, but a plausible one, considering how Iran toys with the world, thus far with impunity.

Is it a coincidence that suddenly last week, when the Iranians apparently realized that, this time, the superpowers and other UN Security Council members were serious about imposing sanctions, a Turkish-Iranian nuclear agreement was brokered, with the Brazilian president’s help? The terms of the deal are nearly identical to those that Iran first accepted, then rejected, last year. A tango.

The deal has Iran exchanging Iranian-enriched uranium, which when further enriched could be used in a nuclear bomb, for fuel rods. However, Iran agreed to exchange only half the quantity of enriched uranium it reportedly possesses. What’s to stop it, for example, from enriching the other half further for use in a bomb?

At the heart of this crisis is Tehran’s argument that it has a sovereign right to possess nuclear technology, combined with its refusal to play by the rules of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, which Iran signed in 1968, and which prohibits development of nuclear weapons. The issue isn’t Iran’s right to create electricity from nuclear power, rather the fact that an Iran with nuclear weapons would constitute a regional superpower. It would place Ahmadinejad’s hands on the oil spigots of the Gulf states, and perhaps those of Saudi Arabia as well.

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, endangering the West’s oil supply, the U.S. and its allies attacked Iraq. But the world could not do the same with a nuclear-armed Iran.

Intelligence records show Iran started working toward nuclear weapons as early as 1990, long before Ahmadinejad became president. This came to light in 2002, with the public revelation of the existence of a nuclear facility at Natanz. International scrutiny followed. Iran’s then-president, reformist Mohammad Khatami, insisted that his country’s ambitions were solely for nuclear energy. He assured his countrymen that this would enhance Iran’s technological capabilities, thus elevating Tehran’s status in the region and worldwide, while bolstering national pride and demonstrating defiance to the bullying foreign powers.

When Ahmadinejad first assumed office, he wasted no time in declaring that nuclear research would proceed regardless of what the Europeans and the Americans did or said. He told parliament on August 6, 2005: “I don’t know why some countries cannot understand that the Iranian people will not succumb to force.” Ahmadinejad’s subsequent rhetoric shows that he, like his predecessor Khatami, continues to see the president as the one who will protect Iran from condescending foreigners trying to stop it from becoming nuclear.

Iran has the know-how, technology and materials to build a nuclear bomb. What it needs now is time: to enrich enough weapons-grade uranium to build at least one such bomb. Then, Iran believes, it – and not the UN, the U.S., or the rest of the world – will be able to dictate the terms of any agreement it is a party to. To gain that time, Tehran is dancing the tango.

Whenever the world’s patience seems to be at an end, the Iranians hint that they are amenable to a compromise. When negotiations behind closed doors commence, and weeks are wasted on futile talk, public attention is deflected and Iran’s willingness to settle evaporates. One step forward, two steps back. Tango, Iranian-style.

The proposed UN resolution for sanctions is important because it came immediately after the announcement of the Iranian-Turkish deal, indicating that the powers weren’t taken in by it. But even a UN-drawn line in the sand will not deter Iran. Cuba has been subjected to more severe sanctions since 1961, and yet maintained its defiance. Iran is unlikely to react differently.

The time has come for the countries of the world to recognize that a nuclear-armed Iran could bring their economies to their knees by hiking the price of Middle East oil astronomically, and that what is needed is more than rhetoric and mild sanctions against Iran. Now is the time to move, not just talk. As Eli Wallach said in the epic spaghetti Western “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly”: “When you have to shoot, shoot! Don’t talk.” If bold action is to be taken, it must be taken before Ahmadinejad appears on TV announcing that Iran has tested its first nuclear bomb in the Iranian desert. By then, the tango dance party will be over.

Haggai Carmon is an international lawyer and the author of four intelligence thrillers, www.carmonlaw.com.

Haaretz Op Ed 01 03 10

Iranian officials are accusing the United States of trying to encourage a “velvet revolution” in Iran. That term was first used in 1989 to describe the nonviolent revolution in Czechoslovakia that overthrew the communist government. And indeed, as part of its velvet war against Iran, the United States is broadcasting cultural programs in Farsi in support of democracy and human rights, so as to influence Iranian public opinion in favor of regime change. But all is not velvet: In the shadows, there is another ongoing conflict between the United States and its allies and Iran – a clandestine intelligence war where velvet tactics are hardly employed.

Most “shadow” events are muffled or mislabeled by Iran. In early March 2007, retired Iranian general Ali Reza Asgari disappeared from his hotel in Turkey after traveling to Syria to visit sites holy to Shi’ite Muslims. Subsequently, conflicting accounts appeared in the media suggesting that Asgari had defected to the United States. Iran accused the CIA and Israel’s Mossad of abducting him. A few days later, his name disappeared from the media’s radar.

In late May 2009, another top Iranian nuclear scientist, Dr. Shahram Amiri, vanished while participating in an Umrah Hajj pilgrimage to Medina, Saudi Arabia, with a group of Iranians. Asgari and Amiri are not small fish. They are leviathans in terms of the information they have, and can share, with the free world. Asgari is a former deputy defense minister of his country. When he was forced out by archrival Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Asgari became a disgruntled walking encyclopedia on Iran’s military and nuclear secrets, with enough rage to motivate their disclosure. Amiri was described by Iranian news agencies as a prize-winning Iranian nuclear physicist who conducted research for the country’s atomic energy organization and worked at the Malek-e-Ashtar University of Technology, which is affiliated with the Iranian defense ministry.

In what seems to be a response, Tehran is stepping up the arrest of Westerners and accusing them of espionage. Several of them are being held on charges related to violating U.S. export-control laws – essentially arms dealing. Concurrently, Iran is demanding the release of its citizens in “illegal” U.S. custody. Iranian authorities are thus effectively trying to engineer a person swap.

In late July 2009, Shane Bauer, Sarah Shourd and Joshua Fattal – all young Americans and former University of California, Berkeley, students – were hiking through Iraq’s Kurdistan autonomous region when they apparently accidently crossed the unmarked border into Iran. On December 13, Iran’s foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, said at a press conference that the three would be tried, presumably for espionage.

Are they spies?

Unlikely. No intelligence service is that stupid. There is no need to risk operatives’ lives to collect ground intelligence that is easily and routinely obtained by satellite. The hikers’ conduct demonstrates they were not trained intelligence operatives. They were too conspicuous, as three foreigners moving together in a remote and sensitive border area would be. There, everyone is an informant for someone: Kurds inform on Iraqis and vice versa; Iranian agents meddle in the Kurdish conflict with the surrounding countries to obtain independence; Israeli Mossad agents are rumored to be maintaining their half-a-century-old ties with the Kurds – the list goes on.

If the hikers had indeed been spies carrying sophisticated surveillance or communication devices, the Iranians would without question have displayed those devices in a televised news conference celebrating the capture of “dangerous American spies.” In July, the Iranian regime was wobbling and President Ahmadinejad needed every bit of evidence available to prove he was defending his country while his rivals were demonstrating in the streets – so his government would not have missed such an opportunity had such devices existed.

In addition to the hikers, Iran is holding other U.S. nationals. A former FBI agent, Robert Levinson, has been missing since he held a meeting with an Iranian on Kish Island more than three years ago. Iran has not, however, acknowledged holding him.

The United States has demanded the release on humanitarian grounds of the three American hikers. According to Swiss intermediaries, Iranian authorities countered with a list of 11 Iranians, including presumed defectors Asgari and Amiri, demanding their release. Nine Iranians on the list are believed to be in U.S. prisons, awaiting trial or already convicted in cases involving conspiracy to illegally export U.S.-manufactured military equipment, aircraft parts, software or other sensitive products to Iran. Tehran is trying to equate the three young hikers, who accidentally wandered into Iran, with arms dealers seeking to procure U.S. weapons technology prohibited from being exported to Iran. In effect, Iran is taking hostages and trying to bargain them off.

If the Iran is indeed proposing an exchange – Iranians convicted in the United States, for Americans held in Iran – it is following an old precedent from Cold War days. Obviously, no deal could ever include Iranian defectors, even if held by the United States. That would doom any future defection to the United States.

The Iranians are unlikely to release the three hikers without significant political payback. Whatever happens, we can assume that Iran – a nation in which bargaining and trading is a national birthright – will not end up empty-handed.

Haggai Carmon is an international lawyer and an author of four intelligence thrillers.

So it turns out presidents read spy thrillers too. I just received a letter from Israel’s President Shimon Peres, and I wanted to share with my readers his review of Triangle of Deception, my most recent novel:

“As in your previous books, this thriller offers a riveting story, fluidly written, full of characters and events.”

I love hearing from all my readers – not only the presidential ones – so please feel free to leave a comment with your thoughts or questions!

Earlier than expected, The Red Syndrome is now available in Audio – both in CD and MP3 download. With it, the first three titles in my intelligence thriller series are now available in Audio. This has been an exciting development for 2009, and it will continue on into the new year, as the Audio edition of Triangle of Deception, my fourth thriller (released October 2009), will be out in the not too distant future.

People read in different ways — some read one chapter every evening, others stay up all night to finish a book in one go, still others only ever read on public transportation. Audio adds a completely different option to shaping your ‘reading’ experience, and Kevin Foley’s reading has truly given The Red Syndrome a new voice.

So if intelligent, current thrillers are your thing, but your eyes need a little break this holiday season – may I recommend you keep your brain (and ears) engaged with The Red Syndrome in Audio?

Haaretz Op Ed 12 11 2009

While the world eyes Dubai’s failing economy with great concern, across the bay, Iran sees opportunity. Dubai is the only oil-free city-state of the United Arab Emirates. Until mid-November, it was best known for its spectacular economy and luxurious high-rises.

Intelligence services the world over, however, have long regarded Dubai as a rat’s nest of money launderers, smugglers and arms dealers, teeming with mobsters – Indian, East Asian and Russian thugs, Arab terrorists and Iranian government agents. Dubai’s underground banking system was used to transfer money to the 9/11 terrorists and Hezbollah. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, used a Dubai shell company to distribute Malaysian-made centrifuge components, used for uranium enrichment.

The emirate turned a blind eye to these activities. With no oil, its economy was dependent on trade – of any color. Under growing U.S. pressure, however, official Dubai had to remove its blinders; it was that or sanctions. Thus in 2007, Emir Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum vowed to honor UN Security Council sanctions against Iran.

And at least on the surface, Dubai did initially work to comply. Most of its banks announced they would no longer be dealing with Iranian banks. Even worse for Iran, Dubai started cooperating with the United States to uncover shell corporations used by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and other groups to import embargoed goods. It became harder for an Iranian citizen to get a work visa for Dubai. The West’s pressure had good reason: a nuclear one.

For Iran, Dubai had been a logical playground. There are more than 500,000 Iranians living in the Gulf, most of them in Dubai. Many are employed by the more than 4,000 Iranian-owned businesses. This made it easier for Iran to secretly place orders in Europe and Asia for materials that could be used for dual civil and military purposes. Once in Dubai, they were openly shipped across the bay to Iran.

When Dubai started complying more strictly with UN sanctions, however, Iran’s embargo-bypass methods started faltering. In one case, the Iranians unsuccessfully attempted a circular transaction from a European company, through China, to purchase vacuum pumps that could be used in civil industry, but are also essential for uranium enrichment. Another transaction, by Aban, an Iranian firm, involved the purchase from China of 30 tons of tungsten, which is used in the aircraft industry, but also for missiles. The emirate stopped that shipment in 2008.

Obviously, this and similar decisions by Dubai enraged the Iranians, who were not prepared to give up their stronghold there. The emirate’s financial crisis, which erupted in mid-November – Dubai has an estimated $140 billion in debt – provides a golden opportunity for Iran to renew its grip. First, Iran, which has plenty of undercover operatives in Dubai, is trying to identify foreign intelligence agents investigating embargo violations. Some could even be in mortal danger, should Iran start planning “accidents” for them.

Iran has spent the last three decades weaving a secret network of sleeper cells in the Gulf States. Adel Assadinia, who was Iran’s consul-general in Dubai until his defection seven years ago, told the Daily Telegraph in 2007 that these cells include well-trained agents working as teachers, doctors and nurses at Iranian-owned schools and hospitals. If his claim is true, then the agents could now be waiting for an Iranian order to “wake up” and destabilize Dubai’s regime. Their network was probably told to prepare itself to hit American interests and instigate civil instability in Dubai if the United States or Israel attack Iranian nuclear installations. Even before that, however, these sleeper cells could seize the opportunity created by the financial crisis to increase Iranian control.

Iran can rock Dubai in several ways, covertly and overtly. Iran owns about $300 billion in Dubai assets. Withdrawing substantial amounts of money from the emirate’s banks would make them – and Dubai’s economy – collapse in a matter of days. This would be just the beginning. Below the surface, Iranian agents could incite strikes: With Dubai’s failing economy and growing unemployment, this too would not be difficult. Iranian agents could also sabotage government installations such as the airport and power stations.

However, these steps may not be necessary. The emir is facing a serious dilemma. It is one thing to comply with U.S. demands and UN resolutions to avoid sanctions. But it is something else to put his emirate and his throne in jeopardy. He could confront the West’s sanctions and yield to Iran, becoming Iran’s puppet, or struggle to survive, with the help of Abu Dhabi, which would come with a hefty price tag economically and in terms of lost pride. Dubai and Iran are economically interdependent, and therefore, without an immediate bail-out, Dubai would quake not just financially, but also politically. Unless financial assistance comes from fellow emirates, or the West, Dubai will fall into Iran’s hands.

Iranian control over Dubai could spread across the rest of the largely pro-Western Gulf region, in a domino effect. Such a scenario of Iranian control is likely to happen only years from now, when Iran becomes nuclear. Then, the West’s ability to prevent Iran from forcing the oil-rich Gulf States to yield to its regional hegemony would be significantly diminished. The unavoidable conclusion is that a Western bailout of Dubai will only delay, but not prevent, Iranian control. With Ahmadinejad’s hands on the oil spigots of the UAE, which has the world’s sixth-largest reserves, the West’s economy should brace itself for the worst.

Haggai Carmon is an international lawyer and an author of four intelligence thrillers.